

Message Text

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TO AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY

AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PRIORITY

S E C R E T STATE 110676

EXDIS

MOSCOW FOR STOESSEL

EYES ONLY MINISTER SPIERS, AMBASSADOR RICHARDSON, AND
AMBASSADOR STOESSEL

FOLL REPEAT US NATO 2423 ACTION SECSTATE SALT TWO GENEVA
30 APRIL 75:

QUOTE

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PFOR, NATO

SUBJECT: NAC CONSULTATION ON SALT

REF: A. USNATO 2367

B. SALT TWO GENEVA 0185

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1. AS A FOLLOW UP TO APRIL 29 MEETING BETWEEN AMBASSADOR
AND AMBASSADOR CATALANO (ITALY) REGARDING A NAC SALT BRIEFING
(REFTEL A), POLAD HELD FURTHER DISCUSSIONS WITH ITALIAN
DELEGATION (CIARRAPICO). CIARRAPICO SAID THAT PAPER AMBASSADOR
CATALANO HAD PROMISED TO PROVIDE AMBASSADOR BRUCE COULD

NOT BE RELEASED TO THE AMERICAN DELEGATION AS YET BECAUSE OF PRESUMABLY SOME SMALL CHANGE WHICH HAD TO BE MADE IN IT. HE DID, HOWEVER, OFFER TO HAVE POLAD READ THE REPORT AND TAKE NOTES ON IT. HE LATER PROVIDED POLAD A COPY OF THE PAPER ON A PERSONAL CONFIDENTIAL BASIS. PLEASE PROTECT.

2. THE PETRIGINI GROUP INDICATES THE ALLIES WILL BE INTERESTED IN DISCUSSING THE FOLLOWING:

NON CENTRAL SYSTEMS (FBS);
DEFINITION OF WEAPON SYSTEMS;
NON TRANSFER;
NON CIRCUMVENTION.

3. TEXT FOLLOWS: BEGIN TEXT

GUIDELINES FOR DISCUSSION ON SALT

THE QUESTION OF NON CENTRAL SYSTEMS (FBS)
THE MEMBERS OF THE GROUP MAY WANT TO INDICATE TO THE USA THAT THEY HAVE TAKEN ATTENTIVE NOTE OF THE FACT THAT THE SIVLET SIDE INTENDS TO RAISE THE QUESTION OF FBS IN THE FRAMEWORK OF THE SUBSEQUENT NEGOTIATIONS ON REDUCTIONS. THEY MAY WANT TO RECOMMEND THAT SUCH ADVANCE NOTICE BE MET AS OF NOW BY THE US, WITH A FIRM REJECTION. THE EXISTING ATTITUDE WHICH THE US HAS ADOPTED, IN FULL CONSULTATION AND AGREEMENT WITH ITS EUROPEAN ALLIES, SHOULD BE MAINTAINED AND RECONFIRMED.

"DEFINITIONS" OF WEAPON SYSTEMS

WE RECOGNIZE THAT, AS STATED BY THE US DELEGATION AT THE SALT TALKS, ONE OF THE SUBSTANTIVE DIFFICULTIES OF THE PRESENT ROUND OF NEGOTIATIONS WILL LIE IN ARRIVING AT SATISFACTORY DEFINITIONS OF THE WEAPON SYSTEMS TO BE LIMITED BY AN AGREEMENT. THIS ISSUE CLEARLY AFFECTS EUROPEAN INTERESTS INASMUCH AS ANY AMBIGUITY IN SUCH AGREED DEFINITIONS MAY HAVE DANGEROUS IMPLICATIONS FOR DEFENCE CAPABILITIES OF DIRECT CONCERN TO THE EUROPEANS. NOTHING IN THE AGREEMENT SHOULD CONSTRAIN THE AREA
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OF TECHNOLOGICAL PROGRESS, WHICH REMAINS A BASIC ASSET OF WESTERN SECURITY. MOREOVER CARE SHOULD BE TAKEN TO AVOID LANGUAGE WHETHER IN DEFINITION OR VERIFICATION MEASURES OR OTHERWISE WHICH MIGHT PREJUDICE ALLIED INTERESTS IN OTHER DISARMAMENT NEGOTIATIONS. IN THE LIGHT OF THESE CONSIDERATIONS AND OF ANY FURTHER INDICATION OF AMERICAN VIEWS ON THIS SUBJECT IT APPEARS ADVISABLE:

(1) TO STRESS THAT DEFINITIONS OF SYSTEMS LIMITED BY THE AGREEMENT SHOULD BE EXPRESSED IN TERMS OF SPECIFIC NAMED TYPES (EG "BISON AND BACKFIRE") RATHER THAN BY GENERAL CATEGORIES (EG "HEAVY BOMBERS") OR ACCORDING TO PARTICULAR CRITERIA (EG BY RANGE OR PAYLOAD.) OTHER STRATEGIC SYSTEMS, EG FOLLOW ON SYSTEMS, WOULD LOGICALLY BE THE SUBJECT OF FURTHER NEGOTIATIONS BETWEEN THE TWO SIDES. IN THIS WAY THE OPPORTUNITIES FOR THE RUSSIANS TO SEEK

TO INCLUDE ADDITIONAL US OR ALLIED SYSTEMS WITHIN THE SCOPE OF THE CHOSEN DEFINITIONS WOULD BE REDUCED TO THE MINIMUM;

- (2) TO SUBMIT TO THE AMERICANS THE TENTATIVE LISTS ATTACHED AT ANNEX AND TO SEEK THEIR VIEWS ON THEM.

"NO TRANSFER CLAUSE"

THE US SHOULD BE ADVISED THAT THEIR EUROPEAN ALLIES WOULD CONSIDER THE INCLUSION IN THE AGREEMENT OF ANY "NO TRANSFER" CLAUSE AS EXTREMELY PREJUDICIAL TO THE COMMON DEFENCE AND SECURITY INTERESTS. ANY AGREEMENT SHOULD NOT CONSTRAIN:

- (1) POSSIBLE FUTURE COLLABORATION BETWEEN THE AMERICANS AND THE EUROPEAN ALLIES IN THE SUPPLY OR MANUFACTURE OF NEW GENERATIONS OF STRATEGIC DELIVERY SYSTEMS;
 - (2) THE PROSPECTS OF EUROPEAN UNIFICATION;
 - (3) THE US ABILITY TO SUPPLY THE ALLIES WITH CERTAIN AIRCRAFT (EG F4 AND F111) AND TACTICAL MISSILE SYSTEMS (DG PERSHING) AND FOLLOW ON SYSTEMS OF BOTH AIRCRAFT AND MISSILES WHICH THE RUSSIANS MIGHT CLAIM TO BE "STRATEGIC" WITHIN THE TERMS OF THE AGREEMENT;
 - (4) THE TRANSFER OF SYSTEMS OF WIDER MILITARY APPLICATION EVEN THOUGH THEY HAVE A STRATEGIC SYSTEMS APPLICATION
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ALSO;

- (5) THE TRANSFER OF TECHNOLOGY IN ALL FIELDS WHERE THIS IS NOT INTENDED FOR THE PRODUCTION OF SYSTEMS LIMITED BY THE AGREEMENT;
- (6) THE TRANSFER OF TECHNICAL DESCRIPTIONS OR PLANS FOR THE DESIGN OR IMPROVEMENT OF SYSTEMS OR SUB SYSTEMS DESTINED FOR RESEARCH AND PEACEFUL USE (ELECTRONIC SUB SYSTEMS, AUXILIARY SYSTEMS CAPABLE OF BEING USED FOR THE LAUNCHING OR TAKEOFF, LANDING OR MAINTENANCE OF MISSILES AND AIRCRAFT;
- (7) CONTINUED US SUPPORT FOR THE BRITISH CONTRIBUTION TO NATOS STRATEGIC STRENGTH UNDER EXISTING ARRANGEMENTS.

IT APPEARS THAT A "NO TRANSFER" CLAUSE WHICH MIGHT CONCILIATE SUCH DIVERSE AND SIDE RANGING REQUIREMENTS IS HIGHLY HYPOTHETICAL, AND THAT NO FORMULATION CAN CONCEIVABLY COVER ALL THESE ESSENTIAL AREAS. NO RECIPROCAL BENEFIT IS MOREOVER TO BE EXPECTED FROM THE EASTERN SIDE, AS NO SIGNIFICANT TRANSFER OF STRATEGIC WEAPONRY AND TECHNOLOGY FROM THE USSR TO ITS ALLIES IS TO BE EXPECTED. ANY CONSTRAINT OF THIS NATURE WOULD

IN PRACTICE TURN TO THE DISADVANTAGE OF THE WEST.

WE SHOULD THEREFORE STRESS TO THE US OUR EXPECTATION THAT ANY SOVIET REQUEST FOR A "NO TRANSFER" CLAUSE WOULD BE MET BY A FIRM REJECTION. IF NECESSARY, THE US MAY WISH TO ARGUE THAT BOTH THE US AND THE USSR HAVE OBLIGATIONS UNDER THE NON PROLIFERATION TREATY THAT ALREADY DEAL SATISFACTORILY WITH ANY RELEVANT "NO TRANSFER" REQUIREMENT. IF ESSENTIAL, PROLONGED SOVIET INSISTENCE ON THIS ISSUE COULD BE MET BY CONSIDERATION OF AN EVENTUAL GENERALIZED "NON-CIRCUMVENTION" CLAUSE, AS INDICATED BELOW.

"NON-CIRCUMVENTION" CLAUSE

IN GENERAL TERMS, IT MAY BE OBSERVED THAT A "NON-CIRCUMVENTION" CLAUSE WITHIN A SALT AGREEMENT COULD PROVE EQUALLY HARMFUL FOR EUROPEAN INTERESTS, AS A "TRANSFER" CLAUSE. ANY FORMULA OF "NON-CIRCUMVENTION" MAY PRESENT THE RISK OF RE-INTRODUCING INTO SECRET

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THE NEGOTIATION THE ISSUE OF COMPENSATION FOR THE EXCLUSION OF NON CENTRAL SYSTEMS OR THIRD COUNTRY NUCLEAR FORCES. ALTHOUGH A "NON-CIRCUMVENTION" CLAUSE COULD PLACE USEFUL CONSTRAINTS ON THE WARSAW PACT, IT WOULD ALSO RESTRICT FLEXIBILITY IN SUCH AREAS ESSENTIAL TO NATO SECURITY AS WEAPONS DESIGN, PROCUREMENT AND DEPLOYMENT AS WILL AS IN CONTINGENCY PLANNING. THE BENEFITS TO BE DERIVED BY POSSIBLE CONSTRAINTS ON SOVIET NON CENTRAL SYSTEMS TARGETED ON WESTERN EUROPE, AS THINGS STAND AT PRESENT, WOULD NOT REPRESENT ADEQUATE COMPENSATION FOR THE LOSS FLEXIBILITY IN THE USE OF NON CENTRAL SYSTEMS ON WHICH ALLIANCE SECURITY RELIES SO HEAVILY.

IN THE ULTIMATE ANALYSIS, A NEGATIVE US REACTION TO EVENTUAL SOVIET INITIATIVES BOTH ON NON TRANSFER AND ON NON CIRCUMVENTION WOULD BE THE OPTIMAL ANSWER TO BASIC EUROPEAN REQUIREMENTS. HOWEVER, AS INDICATED ABOVE, IF SOME CONCESSION WAS NECESSARY IN RESPONSE TO SOVIET PRESSURE FOR A NON TRANSFER CLAUSE WE CAN ENVISAGE A GENERALIZED NON CIRCUMVENTION CLAUSE AS A FALL BACK POSITION. THIS SHOULD BE SUBJECT TO CERTAIN CONDITIONS BEARING IN MIND, NOT LEAST, ITS POTENTIAL EFFECT IN RELATION TO SALT III.

A "NON CIRCUMVENTION" CLAUSE SHOULD BE SO WORDED AS TO AVOID THE RISKS MENTIONED ABOVE. ALSO IT SHOULD NOT LEAVE ROOM TO INTERPRETATIONS CONFLICTING WITH THE PROSPECTS AND REQUIREMENTS OF EUROPEAN UNIFICATION. NOR SHOULD IT BE IN ANY WAY INCOMPATIBLE WITH EXISTING INTERNATIONAL OBLIGATIONS WHICH MAY HAVE TO BE SAFELY GUARDED BY A SEPARATE CLAUSE.

THE WHOLE PROBLEM, AS ALREADY INDICATED BY THE US DELEGATION, WOULD IN ANY CASE BE THE SUBJECT OF CONSULTATION IN THE NORTH ATLANTIC COUNCIL (PARAGRAPH 4 OF THE ANNEX TO PO/73/1,

DATED 5 JANUARY 1, 1973).

INTER-CONTINENTAL BALLISTIC MISSILES

ANNEX A

US USSR EUROPE

A. LAUNCHED FROM SILOS

USSR SYSTEMS

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SS-7 (SADDLER)	COUNT	COUNT	COUNT
SS-8 (SASIN)	COUNT	COUNT	COUNT
SS-9 (SCARP) (HEAVY)	COUNT	COUNT	COUNT
SS-11 (SEGO)	COUNT	COUNT	COUNT
SS-13 (SAVAGE)	COUNT	COUNT	COUNT
SS-16	COUNT	COUNT	COUNT
SS-17	COUNT	COUNT	COUNT
SS-18 (HEAVY)	COUNT	COUNT	COUNT
SS-19	COUNT	COUNT	COUNT

US SYSTEMS

TITAN (IF STILL IN SERVICE)	COUNT	COUNT	COUNT
MINUTEMAN 1, 2, 3	COUNT	COUNT	COUNT
MX (IF DEVELOPED)	COUNT	COUNT	COUNT

B. ICBMS LAUNCHED FROM BOMBERS

ALL MISSILES IN SECTION A	COUNT	COUNT	COUNT
(IF DEVELOPED IN THIS MODE)			

C. ICBMS LAUNCHED FROM AIRCRAFT

OTHER THAN BOMBERS

ALL MISSILES IN SECTION A	COUNT	FORBIDDEN	COUNT
(IF DEVELOPED IN THIS MODE)			

D. ICBMS DEPLOYED IN LAND

MOBILE MODE

SS-16 (IF SO DEVELOPED)	UNCLEAR	COUNT	COUNT IF
WHETHER	PERMITTED		
PERMITTED			
OR NOT.			
COUNT IF			
PERMITTED.			

OTHER DELIVERY SYSTEMS

US USSR EUROPE

E. HEAVY BOMBERS

BISON AND BEAR	COUNT	COUNT	COUNT
BACKFIRE	COUNT	DO NOT	COUNT
	COUNT		
B1	COUNT	COUNT	COUNT

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B52 COUNT COUNT COUNT

F. SUBMARINE LAUNCHED BALLISTIC

MISSILES

SS-N-5	COUNT ON	COUNT ON	COUNT ON
	H-CLASS	H-CLASS	H-CLASS
	SUBS	SUBS	SUBS
SS-N-6	COUNT	COUNT	COUNT
SS-N-8	COUNT	COUNT	COUNT
POLARIS	COUNT	COUNT	COUNT
POSEIDON	COUNT	COUNT	COUNT
TRIDENT	COUNT	COUNT	COUNT
	(NOT		
	MORE THAN		
	240 PERMIT-		
	TED.)		

G. CRUISE MISSILES -

AIR LAUNCHED

(RANGE IN EXCESS OF
600 KM)

USSR CRUISE MISSILES	DO NOT	WOULD	DO NOT
	COUNT	COUNT IF	COUNT
	ANY DEVELO-		
	PED WITH		
	RANGE GREATER		
	THAN 600 KM		

US CRUISE MISSILES	DO NOT	COUNT	DO NOT
	COUNT	COUNT	

H. CRUISE MISSILES -

SUBMARINE LAUNCHED

(RANGE IN EXCESS OF 600 KM)

NONE IN EXISTENCE AT	?	COUNT	?
PRESENT			

I. CRUISE MISSILES -

LAUNCHED FROM SHIPS

OTHER THAN SUBMARINES

(RANGE IN EXCESS OF 600 KM)

NONE IN EXISTENCT AT

SECRET

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PRESENT	?	FORBIDDEN	?
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J. INTERCONTINENTAL

CRUISE MISSILES

(RANGE IN EXCESS OF

3,000 MILES)	COUNT	FORBIDDEN	COUNT
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END TEXT.
BRUCE UNQUOTE

INGERSOLL

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